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Experimental Fiction, Or What Is a
Novel and How Do I Know?
Ralph M. Berry
1 Some years ago while preparing for class, I needed to quote Wittgenstein but did not
have  my  current  copy  of  Philosophical  Investigations  (2009)  at  my  office  (henceforth
abbreviated  as  PI).  As  a  result,  I  found  myself  paging  through  the  old,  marked-up
paperback I had studied as a graduate student. The passage I sought was §283, which
begins with the question: “What gives us so much as the idea that beings, things can
feel?” Glancing at my marginal notes, I was surprised to discover that I had originally
taken the passage in a sense exactly opposite my present understanding. That is, I had
taken Wittgenstein’s question rhetorically, as a challenge to our confidence that other
creatures have feelings. It was as though Wittgenstein himself doubted that horses and
dogs can really suffer. Such an interpretation now struck me as preposterous. It flew in
the face of Wittgenstein’s insistence in PI §303 that doubting pain in any real situation
is immensely difficult, his insinuation in PI §245 that trying to know pain better than its
outward manifestation has something outlandish about it, and his statement in PI §250
that it makes no sense to say a dog’s pain is only a simulation. Responding to the
feelings of others is what Wittgenstein calls a “form of life,” a way of interacting in
which human beings agree. For him, questioning forms of life is futile. It was as though,
having failed to take Wittgenstein’s question literally — that is, as a frank inquiry about
our bond with others — I had gotten his philosophy exactly backwards.
2 So my question is this: why would Wittgenstein ask his question in this form? That is,
the phrase “so much as the idea” is ordinarily rhetorical, is normally used to express
suspicion of an idea. Its implication is that some conventional belief is dubious, with
the accompanying insinuation that those accepting it have been uncritical or naive. My
earlier interpretation, even if mistaken, was hardly idiosyncratic. So, if Wittgenstein
did not intend to question our forms of life, why would he use a form of expression that
in  both  German  and  English  seems  to  invite  misreading,  a  form  that  Wittgenstein
actually does use rhetorically in his very next section? “How could one so much as get
the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?” he asks in  §284, and then retorts: “One
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might  as  well  ascribe  it  to  a  number!”  The  derision  in  these  sentences  seems
unmistakable. I wouldn’t even know how to take them literally. I mean, if you ask me,
“What gives you so much as the idea I care?” I am not likely to think you are making a
frank inquiry.
3 I  start  with  this  example  from  Wittgenstein  because,  when  thinking  about
experimental fiction at the present time, one does not know where to start. No novelist
or movement or body of work provides the kind of central or orienting position, at
least among Anglophone writers and critics, that Joyce, Woolf, Faulkner, and Beckett
provided fifty years ago, and I do not just mean that beginning with William Gass’s The
Tunnel or  Theresa  Cha’s  Dictée  or  George  Perec’s  Life:  A  User’s  Manual  will  seem
controversial.  I  mean that  it  is  likely to seem arbitrary,  as  though one had merely
universalized one’s own subject position or feelings. In saying that a few mostly white,
mostly male, mostly Irish modernists once provided an “orienting position,” I have in
mind something more than that they possessed cultural authority and canonical status,
although I do not want to minimize these crucial facts. However, I am also referring to
a position already staked out at their works’ first appearance, a position not reducible
to  their  later  institutional  recognition  and  that  differentiated  them  from  near
contemporaries  like  E.M.  Forster,  Edith  Wharton,  Graham  Greene,  and  Theodore
Dreiser. I would describe it this way: early modernist experimental novels presented
themselves, not just as formal innovations or challenges to realist conventions, but as
disclosures of what a novel is, of the novel as such. That is, for a reader of Gertrude
Stein’s  Melanctha  or Joyce’s  Portrait  of  the  Artist or  Proust’s  Swann’s  Way,  it  became
necessary to reconsider,  not  only what the activities  of  reading and writing fiction
might mean at present or in the future, but also what these activities had meant at any
time, even in the best known works of the past. That people accepted these modernist
experiments as novels at all thus seemed more consequential than whether reviewers
extolled them as masterpieces or dismissed them as failures. The question that their
acceptance forced, assuming one regarded Eliot’s Middlemarch and Flaubert’s Madame
Bovary as classics of the genre, was how the same concept could apply to such different
examples. Either one ruled out these experiments by definition, it seemed, thus fixing a
limit  on  one’s  concept  —  something  earlier  novelists  and  their  readers  had  rarely
needed to do — or one acknowledged that novels apparently never had been what, prior
to these works, everyone believed them to be.
4 What I mean by staking out an orienting position becomes clearer, I think, if we compare
these early 20th-century novelistic experiments with modernist painting. For the turn-
of-the-century curators, critics, and painters aligned with Impressionism, the paintings
of Cézanne, Van Gogh, and les Fauves did not look particularly innovative. Despite its
break with Courbet’s realism, Monet’s Impressionism was still recognizable as a new,
subjective inflection of the representational aims of earlier art, something British art
historian  Roger  Fry showed  (Fry  1996a)  but  interpreting  Cézanne’s  or  Van  Gogh’s
painting as Neo-Impressionist — that is, as a new, subjective inflection of Impressionism
itself — discounted their work altogether, making it the symptom of an idiosyncratic or
aberrant  psychology.  Part  of  what  made  Fry’s  advocacy  of  modernist  painting  so
controversial was his frank recognition that, for Cézanne and Van Gogh to count as
artists, the subject of Western art history would have to be reconceived. According to
Fry, what Post-Impressionist painters had discovered was “the visual language of the
imagination”, an abstract grammar of shapes and colors, immanent in all classic art,
but  which,  despite  changing  conventions  of  representation,  spoke  “directly  to  the
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spirit” (Fry 1996b: 100, 106). Even for those who remained unconvinced, Fry’s account
raised  the  stakes  of  aesthetic  discussion  unprecedentedly  high.  Monet  might  be
criticized for obscuring the reality Courbet had made vivid, just as Henry James was
often  faulted  for  submerging  action  in  the  vagaries  of  consciousness,  but  such
disagreements did not stake the very concept of painting or fiction. However, if one
took Fry seriously, then the risk of failing to appreciate Cézanne’s achievement was
that one might fail to know what made painting an art. It was as though modernist
works had fused example and concept,  practice  and theory,  present  and past.  This
fusion, or the possibility of it, was what inspired critics like Cleanth Brooks, not just to
concede, but to assert that he was reading Shakespeare and Milton “as one has learned
to read […] the moderns” (Brooks 1947: 193), and when Viktor Shklovsky called Tristram
Shandy “the most typical novel in world literature” (Shklovsky 1965: 57), he, too, was
reordering literary history in accord with contemporary experimentation.
5 All of this may sound both familiar and wrong. My claim has been that what made
novels  like  Joyce’s  Ulysses  or  Faulkner’s  The  Sound  and  the  Fury  or  Woolf’s  To  the
Lighthouse different from novels at other times, both before and since, was neither their
innovations of  form and content  nor  their  challenges  to  norms of  representational
fidelity, but their revelation of something about novels at all times, something about
the human form of life to which the reading and writing of novels is integral. It was
only because modernist experiments laid bare these lived conditions of our concepts,
or seemed to, that formalist critics like Fry, Brooks, and Shklovsky, to name just three,
found  it  reasonable  to  construct  a  systematic  criticism  on  their  basis.  However,  it
remains debatable whether the effect of such disclosures, when viewed in the light of
subsequent history, has been more orienting than confusing. I will explain what I mean
with an example of modernist fiction’s raised stakes.
6 In “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Virginia Woolf maintained that the novelists of her
generation  experimented,  not  out  of  rebelliousness  or  a  desire  for  originality,  but
because, at the time they began writing, “there was no English novelist living from
whom they could learn their business” (Woolf 1993: 240). Unlike the classic novelists —
Woolf’s examples are Jane Austen and Laurence Sterne — turn-of-the-century novelists
like Arnold Bennett substituted social circumstances, economic conditions, and other
conventional markers of identity for what novelists find “permanently interesting,”
something Woolf repeatedly calls “character in itself” (Woolf 1993: 235, 236, 240). In her
essay, this quality, immanent in all classic fiction, is what orients novelists and their
readers in the way that Fry’s “visual language” of shapes and colors is supposed to
inform painting. It makes the novelist’s art what it is. However, when Woolf tries to
explain what she means by “character in itself,” she finds herself in a position not so
different  from  Bennett’s.  Not  only  is  she  unable  to  abstract  this  quality  from  its
conventional associations, but even when she tries to tell a story, hoping to exemplify
it, her embodiment of human character, Mrs. Brown, recedes into an “atmosphere,” an
“impression,”  an  incommunicable  “vision”  (Woolf  1993:  238,  245).  Woolf’s  nearest
approach comes with saying that what makes any character outlive convention is not
its lifelikeness, but rather its “power to make you think not merely of itself, but of all
sorts of things through its eyes” (Woolf 1993: 239). The idea seems to be that, “in itself,”
character is distinct from the markers by which it is identified. Experiencing it is less
like recognizing someone than like experiencing her experiencing. The emphasis falls,
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not  on  what the  other  sees  or  thinks  or  feels  or  even  how  differently,  but  on
experiencing as she experiences, from her position, in her time.
7 Apparently, Woolf thinks that what makes the novel confusing, especially for beginning
readers and writers, is not that this source of its interest changes. Although famously
announcing  that  human  character  changed  in  the  month  and  year  that  Roger  Fry
introduced modernist painting to the London public, Woolf identifies her exemplar of
character, Mrs. Brown, not with her generation’s distinctive viewpoint, but with the
timeless reality that she claims the novel as a form evolved to express. “Mrs. Brown is
eternal,” she declares, “Mrs. Brown is human nature, Mrs. Brown changes only on the
surface”  (Woolf  1993:  243).  Nor  does  the  problem  seem  to  be  that  character  is
metaphysically other, essentially multiple, or even particularly difficult to know. On
the contrary, Woolf stipulates that no one could long survive in the world without “a
good deal of skill in character reading” (Woolf 1993: 235) and insists that her audience
is  as  intimately  acquainted  with  it  as  she.  In  fact,  it  is  precisely  the  familiarity  of
“character  in  itself”  that  seems  confusing.  Noting  that  in  the  course  of  daily  life
everyone has experiences of character as vivid as Woolf’s experience of Mrs. Brown,
Woolf chides her audience for reading so uncritically: “In your modesty you seem to
consider that writers […] know more of Mrs. Brown than you do,” she declares. “Never
was there a more fatal mistake” (Woolf 1993: 248). Again, the stakes seem very high.
Woolf’s  implication  is  that  all  readers  should  be  as  uncompromising  as  her  own
generation, should accept no substitute for what makes works like Pride and Prejudice
and Tristram Shandy permanently interesting. And if, as a result, we find ourselves in
her  generation’s  predicament,  if  no  character,  not  even  Mrs.  Brown,  adequately
represents character “in itself,” that is, if examples and concepts do not fuse, then no
novel or novelist provides an orienting position. The starting point for knowing what a
novel is has shrunk to the size of the individual subject. It is as though every life were
an experiment.
8 I have tried to bring out a potential, if not quite for solipsism, then for something like
radical individuation in the tendency of early 20th-century experimental novels both to
force the question of what a novel is and to present themselves as answers, and my
argument  is  that  we  cannot  make  sense  of  the  novel’s  subsequent  history  without
appreciating  this  potential.  It  is  the success,  not  the  failure,  of  works  like  To  the
Lighthouse  that  assigning  an  orienting  position  to  experimental  novels  or  novelists
today appears arbitrary. However, I must first return to Wittgenstein’s question, “What
gives  us  so  much as  the  idea that  beings,  things  can feel?”  for  it  demonstrates  how
critical for our knowledge of any concept such experimentation is. If other readers are
as impressed as I originally was with the difficulty of answering this question, then part
of what seems impressive is that the difficulty results from no lack of knowledge of
others’ feelings. This paradox — that we find ourselves unable to answer questions to
which it seems everyone must know the answer — recurs throughout Wittgenstein’s
philosophy. In truth, it seems as unclear in Philosophical Investigations as in “Mr. Bennett
and Mrs. Brown” how we could be ignorant of what others feel, since in both works our
attunement to those around us appears so deep and pervasive. Like Woolf, Wittgenstein
believes  that  we  are  frequently  aware  of  someone  else’s  sensations,  that  an
acquaintance’s mood can affect us powerfully, and that, seated on a jet or train or bus,
we may have difficulty not knowing more about what some stranger feels than we want
to. In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, all of our concepts depend on shared forms of
expression and response similar to those Roger Fry believed modernist painting had
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disclosed, forms so integral to our lives that,  were we unacquainted with them, we
would not be able to learn what they are.
9 However,  despite  our  familiarity  with  these  forms,  it  appears  far  from  clear  in
Philosophical  Investigations that  we  know  them.  One  reason  for  doubt  is  that,  when
questioning  any  concept,  we  regularly  confuse  them  with  some  picture  (bild)  or
explanatory model inherited with our language (PI §115), and if we try to abstract the
form from the words (§90-91, §120),  or from the picture with which past usage has
associated  our  words,  we  easily  become  disoriented  (§123),  as  though  our  native
language  were  foreign  to  us  (§116).  Although  this  disorientation  discloses  a  gap
between what everyone knows and what anyone can say about it, Wittgenstein does not
think that an accurate representation of our shared patterns of expression and response
would close the gap. On the contrary, this representation, or its lack, is itself part of our
confusing picture. In explaining the kind of representation that he thinks would, if not
close the gap, then make it disappear, the kind he calls “surveyable” or “perspicuous” (
übersichtliche, [PI §122]), Wittgenstein describes how we experience such a gap:
Here the fundamental fact is that we lay down rules,  a technique, for playing a
game, and that then, when we follow the rules, things don’t turn out as we had
assumed. So that we are, as it were, entangled in our own rules. (PI §125)
10 Wittgenstein’s point here is not that these rules are the wrong rules; even less is it that
there really are no rules,  no collective regularities of expression and response with
which, when correctly applied, our concepts conform. His point is more nearly that
having a concept of something, knowing what feeling is, means knowing examples of it,
knowing feelings, not knowing rules, forms, conventions, definitions, etc. (PI §69, §208).
And if this tautology is Wittgenstein’s response to the question, “What gives us so much
as the idea that beings, things can feel?”, then how does the philosophical problem of
feeling — or of any other concept — arise in the first place? Or as Wittgenstein puts it:
“This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey” (
übersehen [PI §125]).
11 It  has  often been remarked that  the experimental  fiction of  the fifties,  sixties,  and
seventies,  especially  in  the  U.S.,  but  also  in  Ireland,  Latin  America,  France,  Italy,
England, and elsewhere, seemed almost written against itself,  creating philosophical
and narrative problems that it then tried, with unclear success, to overcome. Like the
novelists of Woolf’s generation, the post-WWII writers of anti-novels, metafiction, the
nouveau roman,  early magical realism, and Oulipian potential literature, all struggled
against what they considered widely-disseminated misrepresentations of their art, but
the novels with which they contrasted their works were not only those of the previous
generation, that is, the — by now classic — experiments of early modernism. Rather,
their struggle was also against contemporary and near-contemporary novelists who
wrote  as  though  modernism  had  never  occurred.  To  the  Post-war  experimenters,
writing a novel meant, among other things, doing what Woolf, Stein, Joyce, Kafka, and
Proust  had  done:  laying  bare  conditions  realism  had  obscured,  abstracting  human
interests  from  their  conventional  displacements,  disclosing  what  fiction  is,  what
reading and writing means. However, their on-going commitment to experimentation
exposed a paradox. What exactly had the modernists disclosed? Was it, as Fry claimed,
certain forms immanent in all classic works, forms that made possible one human’s
representation  of  another  and  on  which  the  significance  of  stories  at  any  time
depended,  or  had  modernism demonstrated  the  limits  of  such  forms?  That  is,  had
novels like Stein’s The Making of Americans and Joyce’s Finnegans Wake shown that the
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collective regularities of expression and response were always inadequate, that fiction,
when  it  achieved  what  classic  novels  had  achieved,  was  reducible  to  nothing pre-
existing?  Writing  in  the  early  seventies,  Italo  Calvino  described  literary
experimentation  as  inherently  divided,  expressing  both  a  desire  for autonomy,  for
literature’s  existence  as  “merely  the  permutation  of  a  finite  set  of  elements  and
functions,” and also a desire to transcend these elements and functions,  to “escape
from the confines of language” (Federman 1975: 76-7). Woolf’s pursuit of character “in
itself” can be understood as an expression of either desire or both. And if Calvino was
right,  then  the  postwar  experimenters  faced  a  choice:  either  they  could  restrict
themselves to playing with the forms modernism had already disclosed — forms that,
although timeless, seemed finite in number — or they could attempt a self-overcoming
so absolute, so singular, that the novel as a concept would cease to exist.
12 Surveying the literary experiments of the fifties, sixties, and seventies, I am struck by
how  often  the  insistence  on  a  novel’s  construction  from  definite  recurrent  forms
accompanies the attempt to differentiate it from everything pre-existing, determinate,
or  separately  knowable.  In  the most  blatant  version,  these two,  seemingly opposed
tendencies converge in a novel’s dispelling of its own representational illusion, as when
Humbert tells us in the twenty-ninth section of Part Two of Nabokov’s Lolita (1970),
“Then I pulled out my automatic — I mean, this is the kind of fool thing a reader might
suppose  I  did;”  (282) or  when at  the  end of  Beckett’s  Molloy (1955)  Jacques  Moran
disavows his narrative’s beginning; or when in Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman
(1969) the narrator remarks, “The story I am telling is all imagination. These characters
I create never existed outside my own mind” (80). An effect of such disillusionments is
to abstract the activity of narrating from the action narrated, locating the novel as
such, if not in the words we are reading, then just where seems impossible to say. In the
writings  of  Borges,  Calvino,  Beckett,  Christine  Brooke-Rose,  B. S. Johnson,  Ishmael
Reed, William Gass, Harry Matthews, Clarence Major, Nathalie Sarraute, Alain Robbe-
Grillet,  and  Monique  Wittig,  to  name  only  a  few,  this  irreducibility  of  novels  to
determinate  representation  seems,  not  just  compatible  with,  but  paradoxically
dependent  on,  generic  conventions,  plot  types,  and  stock  characters  sufficiently
determinate to be themselves represented. When at the beginning of John Barth’s story
“Lost in the Funhouse,” (1988) we are told how all story beginnings function, or when
in Borges’ “The Library of Babel” (1962) we learn of the one book that comprehends all
the  others,  or  when  we  discover  in  Gilbert  Sorrentino’s  Mulligan’s  Stew (1996)  the
characters and settings of countless earlier novels, the novel as such seems, if anything,
simply this example in my hand. Such singularity is  one version, I  believe,  of what
novelistic experiments, from early modernism to the present, want. That words are
different from meanings, the announced theme of William Gass’s novel Willie Master’s
Lonesome Wife (1971),  is not for novelists a linguistic theory, philosophical thesis,  or
empirical fact. It is a narrative predicament, and its resolution depends, not on readers
accepting  this  difference,  or  even  making  sense  of  it,  but  on  words  becoming  as
immediately interesting as pleas for help or cries of pain. Only when the word “novel”
acknowledges what I am doing now, does Gass’s novel — or any novel — do more than
create confusion by saying, “These words are all I am” (not paginated).
13 To those for whom writing in the Post-war period meant, not just producing a new
example of a widely-applied concept, but discovering what novels are, what a word like
“novel” is doing, such singular achievements seemed the end of orienting positions. No
novice writer or reader could learn her business from their example; nothing followed
Experimental Fiction, Or What Is a Novel and How Do I Know?
Angles, 6 | 2018
6
from them but themselves. However, as Calvino’s description suggests, it was far from
clear that this kind of transcendence was all the Post-war experimenters wanted. Even
when the concept of a novel completely vanished into these self-identities, a question
remained  whether  they  had  really  established  a  limit  on  all  pre-existing  forms  or
merely disclosed a gap between what every novelist knew and what any novel could say
about it. In fictions from the sixties such as Donald Barthelme’s “Marie, Marie, Hold on
Tight” (1961), Clarice Lispector’s The Passion According to G. H. (2012), Thomas Pynchon’s
The Crying of  Lot  49  (2006),  or Ronald Sukenick’s  “The Death of the Novel” (2003),  a
philosophical  problem of meaning comprised the narrative predicament,  but rather
than resolve it,  interpreting these works as representations of  representations only
replicated the predicament, transferring to the reader responsibility for the problem.
14 In Sukenick’s novella, a question about experimentation’s meaning remained not just
because, when announcing the death of the omniscient author, the fictional author,
Ron,  presumes  to  omniscience,  nor  even  because  he  feels  inspired  to  this  self-
overcoming by a student stroking his thigh underneath the seminar table. It remained
because, when Ron tries to differentiate his writing from all  pre-existing forms, his
words  are  appropriated  by  the  character  Neal,  a  tormented  war-protestor  who,
between the narrated action and the act of narrating it, throws himself off a bridge.
Neal  rails  against  the  confines  of  language,  despising  all  the  unquestioning
compromises that substitute for reality and pleading with Ron to “give me something
that  makes life  worth living” (48).  Both the fictional  author and Neal,  the fictional
reader, seem to believe that, when satisfying answers come to an end, actions are what
count, or in Ron’s words, “Reality doesn’t exist....There is only reading and writing,
which are things we do” (41). However, nothing Ron can say, not even about the “things
we do,”  counts for  Neal,  or  not  enough to make life  worth living.  If  this  pervasive
unreality,  which feels  to  Neal  worse  than death,  is  not  to  confuse  what  Sukenick’s
reader makes of it, reading must differentiate Neal’s refusal of life from Ron’s refusal to
represent it, accepting no substitute for what is permanently interesting and closing
the gap between action and narration, example and concept, present and past. This
demand raises the stakes of both writing and reading as high as life itself, but without
questioning to no end, how is anyone to discover what the word “novel” means?
15 When  taken  rhetorically,  as  a  challenge  to  our  concept  of  feeling,  Wittgenstein’s
question in PI §283, “What gives us so much as the idea that beings, things can feel?”,
conjures a picture of human relations. In it, a gap separates what human beings know
from  the  pain,  fear,  desire,  or  rage  of  others,  both  human  and  non-human.  What
bridges this gap are the regularities of expression and response shared by the members
of any sociological or biological group. Experiencing another’s experiencing, according
to this picture, is responding in accord with the forms of one’s own group to another’s
forms of  expression.  Regardless how immediate the experience,  these shared forms
mediate  it,  and  if  abstracted  or  represented  separately,  they  will  expose  the  gap.
Anytime we question our concepts, this picture is apt to confuse us, substituting for or
displacing the life we share with an indefinitely vast and diverse array of others, but
not because it  inaccurately represents human relations. On the contrary, it  precisely
depicts the distance between remorse and words of remorse, between any individual’s
mood and his or her demeanor, and between all present suffering and the account a
sufferer gives of it later, and it gives a perceptible form to the potential for disaster of
immediate, heartfelt responses to the misery of other groups. Wherever our collective
and individual experience with these gaps has not proven comic or embarrassing, it has
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usually  proven painful,  leaving  its  impression  on our  bodies,  minds,  language,  and
social institutions. When, in the absence of any context suggesting derision or irony, we
hear  Wittgenstein  insinuating  in  PI  §283  that  we  have  been  uncritical,  we  are
responding to these individual and collective experiences of the gap and expressing
how they have made us feel.
16 There is something that, until we hear Wittgenstein’s question literally, we will have
difficulty  knowing,  but  the  surprise  of  Wittgenstein’s  response  to  the  question,  a
response  running throughout  the  section of  Philosophical  Investigations  (§243 -  §315)
dubbed “the private language argument” but concentrated in §284 through §287, is
that  what  the  question’s  rhetorical  inflection  makes  difficult  to  know  are  not  the
feelings of others. On the contrary, all the examples in §284 through §287 presuppose
this knowledge. That a wriggling fly vivifies my imagination as stones and numbers do
not (§284), that my relation to another’s facial expression is hardly less direct than my
relation to my own (§285), that I respond to an injured person differently than to a
damaged  body  part  (§286),  that  my  pity  tends  to  dispel  my  doubt  (§287),  are  just
irrelevant psychological curiosities, not responses to the question in §283 at all, unless I
know in such circumstances that the concept of feeling is the issue. Apparently, my
uncertainty,  when it  comes to  applying this  concept,  whether there is  really  much
difference between a fly and a stone does not mean that, when it comes to applying it, I
do not know the difference between a fly and a stone. In fact, it is hard to imagine any
difference I know better. As Wittgenstein says, “All our reactions are different” (§284).
If I nevertheless question it, if I continue to experiment with my application of this
concept, inflecting PI §283 ironically and opening a gap between words and feelings,
then what I have taken for a representation, this picture of human relations, becomes
my own doing. I  am trying to find out something I  cannot find out while acting in
accord  with  my  group.  It  is  what  feels  so  different  anytime  I  hear  Wittgenstein’s
question  as  a  frank  inquiry.  And  assuming  that,  even  in  the  absence  of  satisfying
answers, my questioning to no end is not just uncritical conformity, assuming I must
know what I am doing, then there seems an obvious point: I experiment with how I
express my feelings and question the forms in which I respond to the feelings of others
because, otherwise, I will never know what it means to have a concept of feeling, to
know what feeling is.
17 The accepted term among literary critics for writing like Wittgenstein’s in PI §283 is
“performative.” Such writing differs from representation in the way that action differs
from the imitation of action and also in the way that any act of narrating differs from
its  resulting  narrative  of  actions.  Although  in  the  absence  of  starting  points  and
orienting positions what counts as experimental fiction will remain indefinite, I believe
that the most satisfying experiments of the last three decades have been developments
of performative writing, and, in closing, I want briefly to mention three, all written in
the U.S. since the early nineties. They are Carole Maso’s AVA (2002), Steve Tomasula’s
VAS (2004),  and  David  Markson’s  Vanishing  Point  (2004).  In  these  three  works,  the
predicament in the novel is also the predicament of the novel, where that means the
concept is implicated in the example, creating a problem for reading and writing that is
overcome only by seeing what a novel is, what reading and writing fiction means. And,
in all three, this predicament entails a gap separating the action from the narration.
What is presently happening and how it is to be presented is itself the predicament. In
Tomasula’s VAS, this gap appears as an action that, from the start, the fictional author,
Square, has already decided to perform, and the written consent to this action that he
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withholds. What creates their separation is the action’s seeming implication in a story
of  violence,  one  written  into  nature  and  culture,  which  Square,  the  book  VAS,
Tomasula, and the reader all know is not merely fiction. In Maso’s AVA, by contrast, the
gap is between Ava’s life as itself an action, one which, to be complete, needs more
time, and her life as a story, occurring to her and us, if at all, only in a moment. Ava’s
predicament is that, having lived her first thirty-nine years as a perpetual beginning, as
unlike anything she has experienced before, she is left feeling — along with Maso and
the reader — that her end is premature. Finally, in Markson’s novel the predicaments in
and of  the  novel  seem almost  indistinguishable,  amounting  to  little  more  than the
fictional author’s difficulties arranging the notes we read. Because the notes comprise
roughly two-thousand examples of misrecognition and obtuseness, examples in which
writers and artists figure prominently, we seem to confront, if not solipsism, than sheer
arbitrariness when we read, “Author is pretty sure that most of [the notes] are basically
in the sequence he wants” (Markson 2004: 8).
18 Although a gap between the action and its narration (between what is known and what
can be said about it) seems implicit in any novel, constituting interests intrinsic to the
genre, in Maso’s, Tomasula’s, and Markson’s novels, this gap takes on a material form.
In  AVA  and  Vanishing  Point,  it  appears  as  a  uniform  white  space  separating  the
individual  fragments,  while  appearing  in  VAS as  the  lovely  but  erratic  layout  that
eliminates the established indicators of textual continuity. In Markson’s case, only the
page  numbering  and  periodic  references  to  the  fictional  author  provide  any  basis,
external to the fragments’ content, for supposing that our movement over the white
space is oriented to more than an accidental beginning or end. The same seems true of
Maso’s novel, with the exception that no fictional author is present and the fragments
have been divided into three sequential sections, “Morning,” “Afternoon,” and “Night.”
However, given both the randomness of Ava’s memories and their tendency to recur in
any  section,  searching  for  evidence  of  chronological  development  seems  futile.  In
Tomasula’s work, by contrast, the more or less conventional representation of Square’s
domestic conflict seems to establish a beginning and end unproblematically, but in the
three-hundred intervening pages the action and its narration seem as discontinuous as
in Markson and Maso. Not only are the pages of VAS inconsistently numbered, but with
the continuity of speaker, topic, and time independent of the layout, although we may
admire each page as we admire a painting or photograph, a passage’s location in the
printed text can mean nothing or anything (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Extract from VAS: An Opera in Flatland, a novel by Steve Tomasula
Art and design by Stephen Farrell. University of Chicago Press, 2004. Source: https://www3.nd.edu/
~stomasul/VAS_homepage.html
19 These material gaps cannot be satisfyingly traversed without in each case resolving the
predicament in the narrative, and what I find particularly productive, not only in these
three fictions but also in other similarly performative experiments, is that this closure
means acknowledging my responsibility for the gap. In AVA, I must experience Maso’s
beginning and end in a given fragment, and once that happens, it becomes obvious that
at every instant it was always possible. In VAS, I have to discover myself on the page I
am  on,  as  though,  when  reading,  I  had  been  elsewhere,  substituting  Square’s  or
Tomasula’s narration for what I am continuously doing. And in Vanishing Point I need to
find the novel’s interest in literature’s and art’s confusions, which is how and where it
has  always  been  found.  In  each  case,  a  discontinuity  that  appeared  written  into
material reality is dispelled by forms of activity in which I have been engaging for as
long as I  have been telling and hearing stories.  They include recognizing in a later
utterance or action the meaning of an earlier one, feeling very differently about the
same sentence depending on where it is located, and experiencing all the doubts about
an author’s words that are raised by the words of a narrator or character. I do not see
any other  way,  following modernism,  that  the  novel  as  such can be  disclosed.  The
achievements  of  experimental  fiction  remain  singular,  not  necessarily  in  the
uniqueness of their form or their self-identical meaning, but in my responsibility being
something I alone can acknowledge. At the limit of what one human can impart to or
about  another,  actions  are  what  count.  By  abstracting  what  we  do  from  the
circumstances in which these actions habitually occur, experimental novelists are not
denying that reality exists or that we can know it, but they are reminding us what our
actions mean, what does or does not come of them. Wittgenstein famously said that his
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aim in writing was to find a way to stop without doing violence to his own or anyone
else’s meaning. It is an achievement of that kind that I believe establishes the starting
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ABSTRACTS
The essay interprets experimental novels as attempts to determine what a novel is, rather than
as  formal  innovations  or  challenges  to  realist  conventions.  A  consequence  of  such  an
interpretation is that the stakes of aesthetic discourse are raised unusually high, making an issue
of the very concept. For modernist novelists like Virginia Woolf, these raised stakes mean that
knowledge of what a novel  is,  although radically democratic,  poses a problem similar to the
epistemology of other minds, that is, a problem of subjective isolation, of solipsism. In such a
context,  understanding  the  history  of  novelistic  practice  subsequent  to  modernist
experimentation requires acknowledging this  potential  of  aesthetic  knowledge to individuate
readers and writers. That assigning an orienting position to specific novels or novelists today
seems arbitrary, if not hegemonic, does not result from anything about the political and ethical
conditions  of  aesthetic  practice  that  modernist  novelists  did  not  themselves  know.  On  the
Experimental Fiction, Or What Is a Novel and How Do I Know?
Angles, 6 | 2018
12
contrary, it results from the success of their experiments, from the aesthetic achievements of
writers such as Woolf. What their conceptually transforming ambitions have made manifest is
that, for those familiar with novels generally, questioning what passes for literary fiction today is
not a matter of lacking knowledge, or none that even the most widely recognized novelist or
critic  possesses.  This  situation  resembles  the  one  addressed  by  Wittgenstein  in  the  “private
language”  section  of  Philosophical  Investigations.  The  specific  resemblance  is  that,  although
concepts of either aesthetics or feelings, once questioned, can prove difficult to justify or explain,
their  difficulty  presupposes  no lack  of  knowledge of  aesthetics  or  feelings.  On the  contrary,
Wittgenstein suggests  that this  “picture” of  a  lack is  itself  part  of  the difficulty.  In his  later
philosophy, conceptual problems seem to arise in much the way that novelistic problems in the
post-WWII period seemed to have arisen, specifically, as a result of language users questioning
the conceptual conditions of their own practice. For experimental novelists of the sixties and
seventies,  writing  a  novel  seemed  as  ambitious  an  undertaking  as  for  their  modernist
forerunners,  but  a  question  arose  for  them  about  what  such  ambition  entailed.  Had  the
modernists succeeded in laying bare the forms immanent in all classic novels, forms on which
the significance of stories at any time depended, or had they demonstrated the limits of such
forms?  The  difference  was  that  between  acknowledging  what  a  novel  is  and  rendering  the
concept unknowable, but both the acknowledgment and its skeptical denial seemed to follow
from  the  same  question.  Wittgenstein’s  solution  to  problems  of this  kind  in  Philosophical
Investigations  is  to  write  such  that  hearing  what  the  question  asks  means  recognizing  our
responsibility for the difference. The accepted term among literary critics for writing of this kind
is “performative.” It differs from representation in the way that an act of narrating differs from a
narrative of action. The essay concludes by showing through brief readings of novels by David
Markson, Carole Maso, and Steve Tomasula, that radically experimental fictions can go beyond
self-questioning, performing an act of acknowledging what narration is.
Cet article envisage le roman expérimental comme une tentative pour déterminer ce qu’est le
roman, plutôt que comme un ensemble d’innovations formelles ou de remises en question des
conventions réalistes. L’une des conséquences d’une telle interprétation est que les enjeux du
discours esthétique sont placés très hauts, et remettent en question le concept lui-même. Pour
une écrivaine moderniste comme Virginial Woolf, cela veut dire que le savoir sur le roman, bien
que radicalement démocratique, pose un problème similaire à l’épistémologie d’autres esprits,
c’etsà-dire  un  problème  d’isolement  subjectif,  ou  de  solipsisme.  Dans  un  tel  contexte,
comprendre l’histoire de la pratique de l’écriture romanesque venant après l’expérimentation
moderniste requiert une reconnaissance de ce potentiel d’un savoir esthétique possédé par les
lecteurs et écrivains individuels. Que le fait d’assigner une position orientante à des romans ou
des romanciers spécifiques aujourd’hui puisse sembler arbitraire, si ce n’est hégémonique, ne
résulte pas de quoi que ce soit qui concerne les conditions politiques et éthiques de la pratique
esthétique que les romanciers modernistes ne connaissaient pas eux-même. Au contraire, cela
résulte du succès de leurs expérimentations, des réussites esthétiques d’écrivains tels que Woolf.
Ce que leur ambition de transformer les choses conceptuellement a rendu manifest est que, pour
ceux qui sont familiers avec les romans en général, remettre en question ce qui est considéré
comme de  la  fiction littéraire  aujourd’hui  n’est  pas  un problème d’un manque de  savoir,  ni
d’aucun  savoir  que  le  romancier  ou  critique  le  plus  largement  reconnu  ne  possède.  Cette
situation  ressemble  à  celle  qu’analyse  Wittgenstein  dans  la  section  des  Investigations
Philosophiques intitulée « le langage privé ». Ce qui est particulièrement ressemblant est que bien
que les concepts aesthétiques ou bien se référant aux sentiments, une fois remis en question,
puissent  s’avérer  difficiles  à  justifier  ou  à  expliquer,  leur  difficulté  ne  présuppose  pas  une
ignorance de ce que sont l’esthétique ou les sentiments. Au contraire, Witgenstein suggère que
cette  « image »  d’un  manque  en  elle-même  fait  partie  de  la  difficulté.  Dans  sa  philosophie
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ultérieure, les problèmes conceptuels semblent surgir de la même façon que les problèmes du
roman dans la période de l’après deuxième guerre mondiale, plus précisément comme le résultat
du fait que les utilisateurs de langage remettent en question les conditions conceptuelles de leur
propre  pratique.  Pour  les  romanciers  expérimentaux  des  années  60  et  70,  écrire  un  roman
paraissait être une entreprise aussi ambitieuse que pour leur prédécesseurs modernistes, mais
une  question  s’est  posée  à  eux  à  propos  de  ce  que  cette  ambition  signifiait.  Est-ce  que  les
modernistes avaient réussi à mettre à nu les formes immanentes à tous les romans classiques, des
formes  dont  dépendaient  la  signification  des  histoires  de  tout  temps,  ou  bien  avaient-ils
démontré les  limites  de telles  formes ?  La différence revient  à  celle  existant  entre le  fait  de
reconnaître  ce qu’est  un  roman  et  le  fait  de  rendre  le  concept  inconnaissable,  mais  la
reconnaissance tout comme sa négation sceptique semblent être produits par la même question.
La  solution  apportée  par  Witgenstein  aux  problèmes  de  ce  genre  dans  les  Investigations
philosophiques est d’écrire de telle manière qu’entendre les présupposés de cette question veut
dire  reconnaître  notre  responsabilité  dans  l’établissement  de  cette  différence.  Le  terme
habituellement  utilisé  par  les  critiques  littéraires  pour  cette  manière  d’écrire  est
« performative ». Elle diffère de la représentation au sens où l’action de faire récit diffère du récit
d’action. L’article conclut, à travers de courtes analyses de romans écrits par David Markson,
Carole Maso et Steve Tomasula, sur l’idée que des fictions radicalement expérimentales peuvent
aller au-delà de la remise en question de la forme propre pour produire de manière performative
un acte de reconnaissance de ce qu’est le récit. 
INDEX
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